Investors prefer to hold diversified combinations of assets. We take this dictum seriously and propose a bundle trading mechanism that would allow investors to trade diverse combinations of assets. The portfolio trading market is designed as an order-driven process where traders submit sealed orders. A mathematical algorithm is used to continuously match orders listed in a closed limit order book. This system is contrasted with existing systems which clear trades separately for each asset. We argue that efforts to develop complex clearing systems can be viewed as a part of an ongoing trend to exploit electronic networks to design trading systems that reflect the needs of the investment community.
We learn from Markowitz's (1952) portfolio selection theory that the average investor prefers to hold diversified combinations of securities. Finance theory predicts that given her income stream, attitudes towards risk, and expectations of returns from various assets, the investor will use principles of portfolio optimization to construct an optimal allocation of assets. The investor then has a couple of different options: she may attempt to trade directly in various asset markets to acquire the specific combination, or she can invest in a basket of mutual funds and thus acquire a portfolio with preferred risk-return characteristics.
The first strategy has at least one obvious drawback: given the structure of asset markets our average investor cannot afford the initial investment necessary to acquire a diversified portfolio of assets. Trading rules require that individual orders be placed for every asset being traded and that the orders be in certain minimum quantities, i.e., in round lots. This raises transaction costs for investors and has resulted in the popularity of the second strategy. Increasingly individuals and households prefer to route their investments through mutual funds and other pooling vehicles.
Market mechanisms are not designed to process trades in customized combinations of assets. A few exchanges offer standardized bundles representing stocks included in widely followed indices. The American Stock Exchange (AMEX) offers two different instruments, spiders, which allow investors to speculate on the Standard & Poor (S&P) 500 index, and diamonds, on the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA). In addition, investors can trade futures contracts written on the S&P 500 at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), and on the DJIA at the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT). There appears to be an asymmetry between the desire of financial institutions to offer standardized as-set baskets that can be sold to large numbers of individuals, and each individual investor's need to create a customized combination of assets.
The fact that investors prefer specific combinations of assets may be interpreted to imply a latent demand for a facility where they can trade combinations of securities. For instance, the investor might decide to reallocate her portfolio by shifting out of one sector, and increase exposure to a second sector; using analytical tools, the investor could decide that this reallocation strategy would be profitable only if it is executed within a specific price range. Implementing this decision would involve the simultaneous execution of buy and sell orders.
But in market institutions like the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the NASDAQ market, equity instruments are traded individually; each stock has its own individual demand and supply functions composed of orders from different investors. The floor traders, specialists, and market makers at various market centers cannot manually execute trades in baskets of assets. This would imply that the investor breaks up her trades into individual buy and sell orders: one for each asset. Though limit prices can be assigned for every order, there is no way the investor can make sure that all her orders will be executed at these (or better) prices. If she used market orders, she has no way of ensuring that the net transaction price is within the target price range.
Basket or portfolio trading is an option available to institutional investors. These trades are executed through block trading desks at large brokerage houses -a network also called the upstairs market. Phillips (1993) , Schmerken (1992) , Popper (1994) and Sacks (1995) are good sources of information about block trading as practiced by the investment community both in the US and in Europe.
In this market, investors rely on the search and risk-bearing abilities of human intermediaries. This exposes them to higher transaction costs, both due to larger commissions and the risk of greater market impact (we will discuss the issue of market impact in some detail later). This paper explores the possibility of designing market mechanisms that can process trades in combinations of assets. Holding everything else constant, such a mechanism has the potential to reduce trading costs, result in a more efficient allocation of assets, and thus improve the welfare of individual investors.
Bundle trading mechanism
We present a new order matching system designed to allow trades in baskets of assets (the terms-portfolios, baskets, and bundles-all refer to specific combinations of assets and as such will be used interchangeably throughout the paper). Using this automated order execution process, investors should be able to buy and sell different financial contracts by placing a single basket order.
The matching of various orders is carried out using a mathematical program.
An example
Assume that as part of her asset reallocation strategy, an investor wishes to execute the following trades: buy 100 units of IBM shares, 200 of Microsoft, 50 of Cisco Systems, and sell 200 units of General Motors, 100 of Ford and 50 of Chrysler. Let us assume that the investor wishes to move out of the automobile sector and instead increase exposure to the technology sector. Ideally she would wish to maintain a balanced portfolio at all times.
In the table below, we list the different securities she intends to trade. Given available information (which would include her expectation of future returns from these investments), the trader can compute the net price (either a single point or a range) at which her asset reallocation strategy would be considered profitable. The investor has to decide on the limit prices to be specified to the order execution mechanism. She can either place separate orders for individual stocks, or use a basket order to trade all assets (in the proposed mechanism, a trader is free to choose a wide variety of combinations). stock qty previous next day's worst close range price 
If the investor decides to place individual limit orders, she has to deal with the uncertainty over the price at which her orders will be executed. In a competitive market, a trader can never be certain of the direction in which asset prices will move in the future. Given this constraint, we assume that she prices her limit orders at previous day's close for each stock (see column (ii)). In column (iii) we present the next day's trading range for each of the six stocks. As we indicate in column (iv), the prices have moved such that the buy order for 100 units of IBM and the sell order for 100 units of Ford stock could not be executed. Instead of having a nicely balanced portfolio, the investor remains over-exposed to the auto sector and under-exposed to the technology sector.
Instead, if the trader had used the bundle trading mechanism, she could have placed a basket order for all the six stocks and specified a limit price of $6,831.25 (see line (a)) using previous day's closing prices. In column (v), we assume that at some point during the day, all stocks are at their worst prices for that day (from the perspective of our investor): stocks she intends to buy are at the highest price and those she wishes to sell are at their lowest. But as her limit price of $6,831.25 is greater than the value of the bundle at this point, $6,750 (see line (b)), her bundle order will be executed. If we relax the assumption that prices are at their worst at the same point in time, then the order will be executed at a price lower than $6,750.
We have chosen asset values such that the bundle order will be executed even in the worst case scenario. It is equally likely that prices will move such that the bundle order does not get executed. But this risk is inherent in using limit orders. As the example above indicates, if asset prices are such that all individual orders will be executed, a basket order too be executed. Instances where individual orders remain unexecuted, the bundle order may still be executed.
It is in this sense that the trader will be better off using the bundle trading mechanism. The trader can be certain that her portfolio will be balanced at all times.
Auction format
The mechanism can be operated as either continuous or periodic auction. Orders in periodic or call markets (like the Arizona Stock Exchange (AZX)) are accumulated and cleared at periodic, pre-specified intervals. In continuous auctions (similar to that after the opening of trading at the NYSE), traders submit orders for immediate execution. In the analysis below we will assume that orders are matched continuously. An interesting feature of the proposed mechanism is that it includes features of both auction formats.
The mechanism is designed as an order-driven process: traders submit or-ders, a mathematical algorithm attempts to match them and asset prices are discovered as a byproduct of the matching process. Traders will submit sealed orders listing the assets combinations (or bundles) they wish to trade, the number of units of each bundle, and the limit price for the bundle order; market orders are not allowed. There are no restrictions on the number of orders a trader can place. It should be pointed out that the mechanism will accepts orders for both single assets as well as for combinations of assets. An order of the following form will also be accepted: {(1 : 0 : 0 : 0 : 0 : 0), 100, $76.25}; this indicated that the trader wishes to buy 100 units of asset a at a limit price of $74.75 per unit.
Trading rules
As the clearing mechanism is modeled as a sealed-order auction, bundle price quotes P i and the composition (b ij ) of bundle orders will not be displayed to the market.
Order update rules
At any given time, a trader can find the status of his order, the number of units that have been matched and the unmatched balance. By clicking a button, the trader can either cancel the order fully or modify it.
Price update rules
Price update or improvement rules in exchanges like the NYSE require that each ask (bid) be lower (higher) than the current market ask (bid) for it to be exposed to the market. An ask (bid) that is higher (lower) than the market ask (bid) is placed in a queue (specialist book ) with lower asks (higher bids) having higher priority. After acceptance of the market ask (bid), the next priority ask (bid) in the queue automatically becomes the new market ask (bid).
Such rules would be feasible in markets where orders are placed for individual assets; but it will be impossible to implement them in a market where orders placed are for heterogeneous combinations of securities. Accordingly we do not impose any price update rules in this market.
Size and time preference
While looking for matches, the algorithm does not take into consideration the size of each order. Thus orders from both small and large traders are given equal priority. We will return to this aspect of the market structure shortly.
Though the specification described below does not place any priority on the time an order was received, the mechanism can be modified to take the time factor into consideration without any material changes in its allocations.
Market clearing algorithm
The trading mechanism is based on a two-step procedure carried out using a mathematical algorithm based on linear programming techniques to solve the bundle matching problem. In the first phase, the program searches for the set of orders and asset prices that will maximize per bundle unit market surplus subject to certain constraints. In phase two, we calculate transaction volumes and prices for the matched orders.
The linear programming problem may be described as follows:
where (assuming each trader places a single order) x i is trader i's weight in the market allocation. The objective function, n i=1 P i x i , describes the market surplus per bundle unit as a function of the quoted bundle prices and the weight of each traders' order in the allocation. We are not considering the total market surplus as it would imply that we take the bundle quantities, the b i 's, into consideration while deciding on the allocations. Doing so would bias the mechanism towards larger order sizes. Order sizes are taken into consideration in the second phase to compute transaction volumes and prices.
The first constraint, n i=1 b ij x i ≤ 0, is equivalent to a standard market clearing condition: the weighted average of the number of units of asset j included in all bundle trades in the allocation is not greater than zero, i.e., the number of units of asset j sold in the market cannot be greater than the number of units bought. Mathematically this constraint is crucial in deriving individual asset prices.
The second constraint, n i x i ≤ 1, restricts the sum of weights of different orders in the market allocation (or in any given match) to be less than or equal to one; and the third constraint, x i ≥ 0, ensures that the weight of each matched order in the market allocation is nonnegative.
Asset prices
Unlike other execution systems, there are no explicit bid and ask prices for individual assets in the bundle trading mechanism. Instead we have what may be considered as bid and ask limit prices for heterogeneous baskets of assets.
As part of the solution, the program will generate dual or shadow prices, p 
Transaction prices
In table 1, we present an example with three traders, (i = 1, . . . , 3 ), and two assets, (j = 1, 2 ). Bundle orders by traders 1, 2, and 3 were matched and their weights in the market allocation, x i , were 0.25, 0.55 and 0.20 respectively. The price at which each bundle will be traded, in other words the transaction price of each bundle, will be denoted by P 
Transaction volumes
Transaction or trade volumes were computed in phase two using the following procedure. We first computed
Using this measure, the number of units of each asset transacted by each trader is computed as
In the example above, α = 181.82; using this value, the number of units of asset a traded by trader 1 will be (181.82) · (0.25) · (1) = 45.45
and so on.
Market surplus
The order matching program selects bundle weights such that the per unit market surplus is maximized. In Example 2 above, this surplus was 0.433; i.e., It will be straightforward to show that the following holds true:
This result can be used to support our argument that the proposed bundle trading mechanism provides traders with incentives to reveal their true valuations, and that its allocations are such that potential traders would be willing to route their orders to the mechanism expecting nonnegative gains from trade.
Market design issues
In this section we focus on features of the market structure proposed here that differ from those of existing trading systems. Briefly, the portfolio trading mechanism is designed to be implemented as an automated system searching for matches among sealed orders-maintained in a closed order book-to trade heterogeneous combinations of assets.
Closed order book
The bundle trading market is order-driven with traders submitting sealed orders specifying asset combinations and limit prices. By definition, the contents of the order book will not be exposed to market participants.
Market transparency
Market transparency refers to the ability of market participants to observe the information in the trading process (O'Hara (1995) ). According to Madhavan (1996) , information here refers to knowledge about past transaction prices, current market prices, quotes and order volumes, "the sources of order flow, and the identities and motivations of market participants." Publicly available information in the basket trading process is limited to past transaction prices and volumes for individual assets, and asset prices implied by unmatched orders in the limit book. If we adopt a narrow definition of market transparency, as the order flow cannot be observed the proposed mechanism is not a transparent one.
We are interested in the degree of market transparency as the information available in the trading process can affect the strategies of market participants.
The behavior of traders in turn affects the performance of the market mechanism.
Splitting the order book
In addition to strategic interaction issues discussed below, there is at least one practical consideration in implementing the bundle trading system as a closed order book. Investors can place limit orders for heterogeneous combinations of assets. As no two bundles will necessarily be alike, one cannot rely on traditional order update rules-like price and time priority rules-to rank these orders.
Thus it will be difficult to publicize the contents of different orders in any systematic manner through an open limit book .
One option could be to break up the order book into two parts: an open book with orders to trade individual assets, and a closed one for orders to trade baskets of assets. In a market with large numbers of basket orders, such an arrangement will not present an accurate representation of order flows. In addition, it ignores the fact that the order matching algorithm used by the basket trading mechanism attempts to find matches among all types of ordersindividual as well as combinations.
Skewed distribution
In most order execution systems in use today, trading information is not evenly distributed among market participants. On the NYSE for example, access to information about orders in the limit book for a specific asset is restricted to the specialist assigned to that asset who in turn is not required to reveal the contents to other participants. In addition, floor traders tend to expose their clients' orders in a selective manner at their own discretion. On the NASDAQ market, limit orders are distributed among large numbers of dealers and brokers.
Information about these orders are held by brokers until the best bid (for a client's sell order) or the best ask (for a client's buy order) reaches the specified limit price.
Consolidating order flows
The trend today appears to be towards implementing systems that consolidate all limit orders into a single database for exposure to all market participants.
Contrary to the closed order book adopted in the proposed trading system, these consolidated order books tend to be implemented as open limit order books. Next Nasdaq which basically involves the implementation of a centralized limit order book.
The shift to open electronic limit order books reflects an evolving belief that there are alternative ways of supplying liquidity and ensuring a stable marketplace. Trading institutions hope to achieve better transparency through the implementation of such systems. An order placed over an easily accessible electronic network will allow a trader to communicate her trading interests to a wider audience. With the help of improved communication systems, a larger number of traders will be able to respond to these orders. Instead of relying on floor traders and brokers to search for best prices, investors can "negotiate" deals directly through entries in the order book.
Costly transparency
The higher transparency delivered by electronic open limit order books comes at a price. A limit order has features of a free option contract: assume an investor places a limit order to sell 100 units of a stock at $20 when the market price is $18; if new information arrives that pushes the price up to $21, assuming she does not cancel her order in time, the investor has now provided the rest of the market a free in-the-money call option. A small investor trading in low volumes would be willing to risk giving a free option to the whole market. But an institution trading in larger volumes might be unwilling to place large-sized orders in the limit book; the risk of providing a free in-the-money option for a large volume of stocks is much higher for such investors. Such an order will also be picked up by the basket matching algorithm; the lower ask price of $21 will increase per bundle unit market surplus. But as we described earlier, the trader who has not updated her price will also receive a share in this higher surplus thus mitigating any losses she would otherwise incur.
Another aspect of limit orders is that the moment one places such an order in an open book, the whole market learns about one's trading decision. If they choose to believe that this decision is based on some private information, other traders can react by placing similar orders at slightly better prices. For example, a limit order to buy a higher than normal quantity at $50 per unit when the market price is $52 may attract other limit orders to buy at $51 and higher. This reaction from other traders will result in increased buying interest which in turn can push the price up to a higher level; the associated cost to the trader who placed the initial limit order is called 'market impact' cost. Institutional investors who spend considerable resources in researching for profitable investment opportunities might be reluctant to "reveal their hand"
to the rest of the market.
Anonymous trading
In 
Price discovery
Trades executed through continuous trading systems like the NYSE and other order driven systems, and through quote driven systems like the NASDAQ are at prices that were either the bid or the ask price quoted by relevant parties to a transaction.
The basket trading mechanism proposed here generates prices by computing bundle weights that maximize per bundle unit market surplus. The price generating process takes into consideration the limit-price and asset-composition specifications of all selected bundles. As we saw in Section 2.3 above, the mechanism computes the transaction price, P This "non-discriminating" pricing scheme in effect averages out the diverse information embedded in the price-quotes of every matched order. In an environment with asymmetric distribution of information, the averaging of prices over all selected trades allows "market clearing prices to work on average rather than for each individual trade" (Madhavan (1992) ). Or as O'Hara (1995) argues, when market conditions are adverse averaging improves the efficiency of the price discovery.
The use of average prices addresses a concern of small, uninformed investors, or liquidity traders: the risk of losing out on a profitable opportunity by trading with an informed trader. If a trader has private information, she would pick off a limit order from an uninformed trader the moment it arrives. The trade would be at the price specified by the uninformed trader. In the bundle market, the transaction price would be an average of the prices quoted by these two traders as well as the prices quoted for other matched orders. The lower transparency of the order book removes the risk of being "picked-off."
The OptiMark system
A recent innovation in automated trading systems has been the OptiMark system designed by OptiMark Technologies. Recently the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) approved a proposal by the Pacific Stock Exchange to implement this electronic trading system. On January 13, 1998, the NASDAQ market announced plans to introduce this technology to its dealers and investors trading stocks listed on it.
The OptiMark system is based on a reasoning that an investor's trading decision is more complex than is reflected by existing trading structures. The investor might be willing to trade varying quantities of an asset at different prices, and she may be able to rank these price-quantity choices on some preference scale. Instead of specifying a single price-quantity limit as allowed by existing systems, investors trading on the OptiMark system can present their respective "demand" and/or "supply" schedules for each asset. A typical specification could be: preference rank of 1 for a buy order for 200,000 units of a stock at a limit price of $100; preference rank of 2 for 125,000 units at $80; preference rank of 3 for 80,000 units at a limit price of $120 per unit. In addition to price-time priorities, the order matching algorithm takes into consideration the specified preference rankings when searching for matches.
The unique design of the OptiMark system can be considered as an attempt to increase the utility flow to an investor. The system will be implemented with a closed order book. Any adverse effects due to reduced transparency may be offset by the ability of the mechanism to capture information embedded in the demand and supply schedules presented by investors. To the extent that existing structures restrict orders to single price-quantity points (and not the whole demand-supply curves), their price discovery processes do not capture all the information inherent in traders' investment strategies.
Bundle trading
The proposed basket trading mechanism differs from the OptiMark system in that it focuses on a different aspect of our understanding of how individuals manage their finances. The value-addition to the basket trading system comes in the form of a process that captures traders' valuation of the facility of being able to trade specific combinations of assets. Trading mechanisms (including the OptiMark system described above) that focus on matching orders for individual assets through distinct processes (a form of simultaneous auction) ignore this dimension of investors' preferences and thus can be argued to have relatively inefficient price discovery processes.
Fractional quantities
In table 1, we notice that trade volumes are in fractional units. The implication for traders 1 and 3 in that example is that they will have to trade in subsequent periods to complete their execution strategy. This aspect of the mechanism obviously exposes traders to execution risk; prices can move adversely before all the bundle units are traded. Larger the bundle size, b i , greater the risk.
Though we have not modeled transaction costs explicitly in our analyses here, this uncertainty can create inefficiencies by increasing transaction costs and in the process reducing traders' expected gains from routing their orders to the mechanism.
There are a couple of different "solutions" to this apparent inefficiency. If orders are cleared continuously, then any unexecuted fraction at time t = 1 could be matched with other unmatched orders at time t = 2. The concept of continuous trading using a computerized system would be quite different from continuous trading on the NYSE floor and through broker-dealer networks in the NASDAQ market. In an automated process searching for matches on a continuous basis, the difference between t = 1 and t = 2 will be infinitesimal.
In this sense in a market with a large number of traders, uncertainty due to fractional trades could be relatively minor.
In a dynamic setting traders will evaluate their order placement strategies weighing the execution risk due to fractional volumes against the gain from being able to trade specific combination of assets. We described earlier that trade volumes are determined based on the following measure
An order's weight in any allocation, x i , depends on both, b ij , the composition of all bundles and on P i , the quoted price of all orders in the book. In the absence of full information of the contents of the order book, the trader cannot influence the value of her x i . This constraint implies that we focus on the value of the numerator. and quantities for various assets could provide some guidance to traders in determining optimal order quantities. Over a period of time, market participants could use this information to devise appropriate order strategies.
New settlement systems
Current transaction settlement systems are not designed to process trades in fractional quantities of stocks and other securities. Trading rules restrict orders to certain minimum quantities specified in terms of round and odd lots.
These restrictions may be viewed as legacies of ledger-based accounting systems and the practice of issuing certificates of title on pieces of paper. Restricting trades to minimum quantities makes sense when relying on human intermediaries to execute orders and settle transactions. But they appear incongruous in a world where ownership records are maintained as digital entries in electronic databases and transactions are processed electronically.
Minimum order size rules raise the transaction cost of trading financial assets. The minimum initial investment required to acquire a diversified portfolio is beyond the reach of the average household. In order to achieve their financial goals, investors rely on mutual funds and other pooling mechanisms. An automated order matching system similar to the bundle trading mechanism described above will be able to execute trades in small quantities. With the help of such mechanisms investors should be able to create portfolios customized to meet their individual needs.
Introduction of such systems could potentially act as catalysts and lead to regulatory changes that would allow firms to issue financial contracts freely scalable in size at the option of the holder of the security. Such developments, combined with smart electronic markets similar to the portfolio trading mechanism, could potentially alter the institutional setup of the financial system. Instead of investing in mutual funds investors could use electronic trading systems to acquire and manage affordable quantities of highly diversified portfolios.
Linking markets
More by accident rather than design, equities and derivative contracts are traded in separate market centers. In the U.S., stocks are traded mainly on the NYSE and the NASDAQ market, futures and options contracts at the Chicago exchanges. Finance theory suggests that derivative instruments can be used to hedge certain risks from investing in equity and debt instruments. But the separation of the trading mechanisms increases the costs of trading different assets.
Given that investors hold these diverse instruments in specific combinations, it is worth exploring the possibility of trading stocks, bonds, and derivative securities through bundle orders.
The first step towards this ideal would be to merge the order matching A critical reason why such mergers are considered feasible today is this: the trading centers referred to above operate over electronic networks, and it is easier to merge similar networks than trading floors. Any merger that requires the linking of electronic trading and settlement systems (a technically and politically feasible task), and does not involve the moving of trading floors to some common location (a politically difficult task in most countries), has a better prospect of clearing various regulatory and political hurdles.
A portfolio trading mechanism operating over linked electronic networks would enable investors to trade internationally diversified baskets of equity, debt and derivatives contracts. Investment advisers recommend that investors hold such diversified portfolios. Now we have a trading mechanism designed specifically to help investors attain this goal.
Multiple mechanisms
The issue of linking numerous asset markets by common clearing mechanisms raises the idea of a "super-market," one where all types of financial securities can be traded through a single order matching mechanism. In theory we can develop an algorithm to perform this task; but it is not clear that such a mechanism would be technologically feasible or even desirable.
Our conjecture is that investors might not be interested in a 'super' mechanism. The portfolio trading mechanism has been inspired by investors' need to hold specific combinations of assets. Investors are more interested in how various asset components complement each other. The proposed mechanism is designed to allow traders to exploit any complementarity between assets. It is thus highly unlikely that any single investor will be interested in acquiring every single asset in the financial system.
Instead of covering the whole universe of financial contracts, institutions implementing bundle trading mechanisms may attempt to restrict the set of assets traded in their respective market centers to those that exhibit non-negligible levels of complementarity. The restricted ability to process heterogenous asset combinations has to be traded-off against the desire of target investor groups to trade a much wider assortment of assets. One may expect market centers to compete by establishing mechanisms where different subsets of assets are traded.
Instead of a single mechanism we could have multiple bundle trading centers.
For example, instead of having a single mechanism for stocks issued by U.S.
and British firms, there could be two distinct market centers each specializing in stocks issued by firms in a single country. These mechanisms could in turn be linked by a third mechanism; an order to trade a combination of U.S and British stocks could be routed to this mechanism which in turn will attempt to trade the distinct classes of stocks as if they were traded in a single system. In the limit, we can visualize a hierarchy of mechanisms with a distribution rich enough to allow trades in any 'reasonable' combination of assets.
Conclusion
The bundle trading mechanism proposed here has been motivated by a perceived gap between investors' desire to acquire specific combinations of assets and trading institutions that are capable of matching orders for individual assets only. The question of whether investors will actually choose to trade baskets of assets is still an open question. The paper does not attempt to address this question. Our focus here has been on exploring a concept: trading combinations of securities over electronic networks. As part of our research into advanced market structures we have developed a prototype of the basket tradig mechanism proposed in this paper. We are now in the process of testing the model using laboratory experiments with human subjects.
It is evident that different markets are moving towards such networks. We have argued that networking technologies can be exploited to develop sophisticated trading systems. The bundle trading mechanism and the OptiMark system can be viewed as attempts to design trading institutions that better reflect the needs of the investment community. Instead of investors adopting
